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Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when and how others may 
collect and use your information.  Adequate informational privacy requires a sufficiently broad 
ability to give or withhold free and informed consent to proposed uses.   
Notice and Choice (sometimes also called “notice and consent”) is the current paradigm 
for consent online. The Notice is a presentation of terms, typically in a privacy policy or terms of 
use agreement.  The Choice is an action signifying acceptance of the terms, typically clicking on 
an “I agree” button, or simply using the website.  Recent reports by the Federal Trade 
Commission explicitly endorse the Notice and Choice approach (and provide guidelines for its 
implementation). When the Notice contains information about data collection and use, the 
argument for Notice and Choice rests on two claims. First: a fully adequate implementation of 
the paradigm would ensure that website visitors can give free and informed consent to data 
collection and use practices.  Second: the combined effect of all the individual decisions is an 
acceptable overall tradeoff between privacy and the benefits of collecting and using consumers’ 
data.  There are (we contend) decisive critiques of both claims.  So why do policy makers and 
privacy advocates continue to endorse Notice and Choice?   
Most likely, they see no need to seek an alternative.  We find the critique of Notice and 
Choice conclusive, but our assessment is far from widely shared—and understandably so.  
Criticisms of Notice and Choice are scattered over several articles and books.  No one has 
unified them and answered the obvious counterarguments.  We do so.  Making the critique plain, 
however, is not enough to ensure that policy makers turn to a viable alternative. The critiques are 
entirely negative; they do not offer any alternative to Notice and Choice. We offer an alternative:  
informational norms.  When appropriate informational norms govern online data collection and 
use, they both ensure that visitors give free and informed consent to those practices, and yield an 
acceptable overall tradeoff between protecting privacy and the benefits of processing 
information.  A fundamental difficulty is the lack of norms.  Rapid advances in information 
processing technology have fueled new business models, and the rapid development has 
outpaced the slow evolution of norms. Notice and Choice cannot be pressed into service to 
remedy this lack.  It is necessary to develop new norms.  
 
 
Table of Contents 
I.  The Allure of Notice and Choice ................................................................................................ 6 
 
* Professor and Head, Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago. 
Partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. DGE-1069311. 
** Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Visiting Foreign Professor, University of 
Gdańsk, Poland.   
 




A. Informed Consent:  The Role of Notices ......................................................................... 7 
B. Free consent:  Affirmative Act or Passive Acquiescence? .............................................. 9 
C. Summing to an Acceptable Tradeoff ............................................................................. 11 
II. The Critique ........................................................................................................................... 15 
A. It Is Impossible for a Notice to Contain Enough Information ........................................ 16 
1. Complexity ................................................................................................................. 16 
2. Long-term retention .................................................................................................... 18 
3. Big Data and its implications...................................................................................... 19 
B. How Can Consent Be Anything But Passive Acquiescence? ........................................ 21 
C. Notice and Choice Leads to Unacceptable Tradeoffs .................................................... 23 
1. The simple tradeoff problem ...................................................................................... 24 
2. The real tradeoff problem ........................................................................................... 27 
III. Beyond Notice and Choice .................................................................................................... 28 
A. Value-Optimality ............................................................................................................ 29 
B. Acceptable Tradeoffs ..................................................................................................... 31 
C. Why Consent is Informed .............................................................................................. 31 
D. Why Consent Is Free ...................................................................................................... 32 
IV. A Key Task: Curing Failures of Norm Completeness ........................................................... 33 
 
 
Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when others may collect and 
how they may use your information.
1
  Adequate informational privacy requires a sufficiently 
broad ability to control collection and use, and this requires a sufficiently broad ability to give or 
 
1 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). See also JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW 
WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 3 (2007) 
(defining privacy “as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on 
oneself”); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (“I 
will use ‘informational privacy’ as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or 
release of information about oneself”); Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“both the common law and the literal 
understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his 
or her person”). 




withhold free and informed consent to proposed collections and uses; otherwise, you cannot 
determine for yourself what others do with your information.
2
   
Notice and Choice (sometimes called Notice and Consent
3
) is the current paradigm for 
securing free and informed consent to business’s online data collection and use practices.
4
  The 
“notice” is a presentation of terms.  The “choice” is an action signifying acceptance of the terms 
(typically using the site or clicking on an “I agree” button).
5
  When the notice contains 
information about a business’s data collection and use, the argument for Notice and Choice rests 
on two claims.  First:  when adequately implemented, Notice and Choice ensures that website 
visitors can give free and informed consent to businesses’ data collection and use practices.  
Second:  the combined effect of the individual consent decisions is an acceptable overall tradeoff 
between privacy and the benefits of information processing.
6
  There are well-known, compelling 
 
2 We do not distinguish between personally identifying information (PII) and non-PII, 
because recent advances in de-anonymization ensure that, in many cases, non-PII may in 
fact identify individuals. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitally Shmatikov, Robust De-
anonymization of large sparse datasets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY 
AND PRIVACY 111–125, 111 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: 
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 
1814 (2011); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
3 See, e.g., Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in THE FAILURE OF 
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES 342, 351 (Jane Winn ed., 2006); and Solon Barocas & 
Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF 
PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009), 
http://senseable.mit.edu/engagingdata/downloads.html. 
4 For a recent description and endorsement of notice and choice, see FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/03/privacyframework.shtm (last visited Sep 26, 
2012)(presenting a version of Notice and Choice that relies heavily on context and voluntary 
or legislative restrictions on data collection and use).  For additional references, see infra 
note 8. 
5 As Paul Schwartz notes, “when a Web site says something about its data processing 
practices—even if this statement is vague or reveals poor practice—the visitor to the site is 
deemed to be in agreement with these practices so long as she sticks around. This 
summary, despite its ironic tone, is no exaggeration.” Paul Schwartz, Internet Privacy and 
the State, 22 CONN. L. REV. 815, 82425 (2000). 
6 The tradeoff claim is rarely explicit in the literature arguing for Notice and Choice.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 37 – 40.    




critiques of both claims.
7
  Policy makers and privacy advocates nonetheless typically insist on 
adherence to Notice and Choice.
8
  The Federal Trade Commission, for example, recently 
endorsed it and provided guidelines for its implementation.
9
   
 
7 An early and influential critique is Paul Schwartz, supra note 6 (Notice and Choice does not 
ensure free choice because of information asymmetries, collective action problems, limited 
rationality, and a lack of market options). More recent critiques include: MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, BOILERPLATE:  THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (Notice and 
choice as implemented is inconsistent with the requirements of free choice); COMMENTS OF 
THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND U.S. PIRG, IN THE MATTER OF A PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF 
REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 33 (2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyreportframework/00338-57839.pdf (“Informed 
consent in the digital marketing era requires . . . a new commitment to candor and honesty 
. . . [the online marketing industry] needs to clearly explain to the user how the data are 
collected and used”); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 
DEDALUS 32, 36 (2011) (noting “the transparency paradox. Achieving transparency means 
conveying information handling practices [however] If notice . . .  finely details every 
[relevant fact] . . . we know that it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But 
summarizing practices in the style of, say, nutrition labels is no more helpful because it 
drains away important details, ones that are likely to make a difference,” and arguing for a 
much greater reliance on context); Barocas and Nissenbaum, supra note___ (consumers 
“confront . . . full-on barriers to achieving meaningful understanding of the practice and 
uses to which they are expected to be able to consent.”); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, 
Notice and Choice:  Implications for Digital Marketing to Youth, (2009), 
http://digitalads.org/documents/Schwartz_Solove_Notice_Choice_NPLAN_BMSG_memo.pdf 
(Notice and Choice fails to ensure a free choice and fails to ensure an informed choice)  ; 
Cate, supra note 3 at 369 (“as transposed into contemporary privacy laws and regulations, 
FIPPS [Fair Information Privacy Practices] have been used to glorify individual choice as if 
that, and not appropriate privacy protection, were the goal of data protection. While privacy 
advocates and policymakers cling tenaciously to FIPPS, at least in their rhetoric, the reality 
is that FIPPS as applied today largely disserve both privacy and other important societal 
interests”); J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting 
Privacy in Commercial Information, U. CHI. L. REV. 109–135, 114 (2008) (“The reality that 
decisions about information sharing are not worth thinking about for the vast majority of 
consumers contradicts the fundamental premise of the notice approach to privacy”); RULE, 
supra note 1 (privacy advocates pay insufficient attention to how to balance privacy versus 
competing concerns).    
8 Notice and Choice has its roots in the formulation of the fair information practices in U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 
(1973), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm (formulating 
the fair information principles in Section III). The practices were later refined and expressed 
in terms of Notice and Choice in THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY 
IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977), http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/; Fred Cate 
reviews the development of Notice and Choice in Cate, supra note 3. Additional books, 
articles, and reports endorsing some form of Notice and Choice include the following: 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 2; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK 
FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY 




A somewhat unsympathetic but not entirely inapt analogy is the old joke about the drunk 
and the streetlight:  
A policeman sees a drunk man searching for something under a streetlight and asks what 
the drunk has lost. He says he lost his keys and they both look under the streetlight.  After 
a few minutes the policeman asks if he is sure he lost them here, and the drunk replies, 
no, that he lost them in the park. The policeman asks why he is searching here, and the 




Policy makers and privacy advocates search under streetlight of Notice and Choice even though 
consent not there.  Why don’t they look in the “park”?  Most likely, they see no need to do so. 
We find the critiques of Notice and Choice conclusive, but our assessment is far from widely 
shared—and understandably so.  The criticisms are scattered over several articles and books.
11
  
No one has unified them and answered the obvious counterarguments.  We do so.  Making the 
critique plain, however, is not enough to move policy makers from the “streetlight” to the “park.” 
The critiques are entirely negative; they do not point to an alternative, a “park” in which to 
search for consent.  As Helen Nissenbaum notes, “Why exactly the existing transparency-and-




We offer an alternative:  informational norms.  Informational norms are social norms that 
constrain the collection, use, and distribution of information.  Such norms explain, for example, 
                                                                                                                           
FRAMEWORK (2010), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/commercial-data-privacy-and-
innovation-internet-economy-dynamic-policy-framework (“To promote informed consent  . . 
. [a revitalized Fair Information Practices] should promote increased transparency through 
simple notices, clearly articulated purposes for data collection, commitments to limit data 
uses to fulfill these purposes, and expanded use of robust audit systems to bolster 
accountability”) ; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, A, U. ILL. L. REV. 357 (2006); NATIONAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, DRAFT CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2013), 
https://www.networkadvertising.org/Draft_NAI_Code_For_Public_Comment.pdf (arguing for 
more effective, contextually presented notices and requiring opt-in for sensitive data). 
9 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 4. 
10 Adapted from DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG: WHY EXPERTS KEEP FAILING US (2010). 
11 See infra Section I.   
12 Nissenbaum, supra note 7 at 34–35. 




why your pharmacist may inquire about the drugs you are taking, but not about whether you are 
happy in your marriage.  When appropriate norms govern online exchanges, they ensure that 
visitors give free and informed consent, and they also implement an acceptable tradeoff between 
privacy and competing concerns. 
 Critiques are most effective when they undermine their targets’ strongest points; 
accordingly, we begin with a review of the arguments for Notice and Choice.  Discussions of 
Notice and Choice typically pay little, if any, explicit attention to its underlying rationale,
13
 so 
our review sometimes, of necessity, extrapolates arguments as much as it reports them.  We 
present these arguments in Section I.  Section II contains our critique of Notice and Choice.  We 
present our norm-based alternative in Section III and conclude in Section IV will a call to study 
norms and their role in ensuring free and informed consent.  
 
I.  The Allure of Notice and Choice 
The allure of Notice and Choice is that it appears with one elegant stroke to ensure that 
consent is informed and free and thereby also to implement an acceptable tradeoff between 
privacy and competing concerns.
14
  We start with the argument that Notice and Choice secures 
informed consent.   
 
13 Noteworthy exceptions include RADIN, supra note 7; RULE, supra note 1. 
14 Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove note that Notice and Choice was initially adopted in 
response to the promulgation of the Fair Information Practices (FIPs). Those practices 
require “(1) transparency of record systems, (2) collection and use of information that is 
accurate, relevant, and up to-date (data quality principle), (3) notice about what 
information was being collected about individuals, (4) a right to prevent information 
collected for one purpose from being used for other purposes, (5) a right to access one’s 
personal information, (6) a right to correct erroneous information, and (7) data security 
protections.” They contend that “In contrast to Europe, where the FIPs were highly 
influential and led to omnibus privacy protections, the United States has adopted a more 
market-driven approach toward regulating consumer privacy. Businesses and marketers 
pushed the notice and choice approach, which selectively adopts only a few FIPs. Only the 
third FIP listed above survives in the notice and choice approach. The fourth FIP – often 





A. Informed Consent:  The Role of Notices 
A website visitor’s consent to a business’s data collection and use practices is informed if 
the visitor has sufficient knowledge of the practices to make a reasonable evaluation of the risks 
and benefits of disclosing information. The required information is typically taken to be an 
adequate amount specific detail about the type of data collected, the purposes for which it is 
used, and the third parties with which it is shared.
15
 Proponents and critics of Notice and Choice 
share this specificity assumption.
16
 We will reject it later,
17
 but we grant it for now.  The problem 
is that visitors generally have little knowledge of the ways in which online businesses collect and 
use information.
18
 Notice and Choice offers an obvious solution: present visitors with the 
necessary information.  The almost universal practice online is to make the presentation in a 
standard form contract.  The relevant information may be scattered across multiple documents—
a privacy policy, a terms of use agreement, a sales agreement, and so on.  Whether in one 
document or several, we will call the totality of the written terms addressing data collection and 
use a “Notice.”  As long as the Notice sufficiently describes the practices, a visitor who reads 
and understands it has sufficient knowledge of those practices.  
                                                                                                                           
referred to as the purpose-specification principle – is recast as 'choice.'” Schwartz and 
Solove, supra note 2 at 1. 
15 See Cate, supra note 3 (reviewing Notice and Choice requirements). 
16 Among proponents, see, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 4; Among critics, 
see, e.g, Nissenbaum, supra note 7 at 36. 
17 See infra Section III,C.  
18 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 4 at 79 (noting that “one of the major themes 
of the roundtables is that consumers lack understanding of various data practices and their 
privacy implications, and thus lack the ability to make informed decisions about the trade-
offs involved”). See also Jeff Chester, CookieWars: How New Data Profiling and Targeting 
Techniques Threaten Citizens and Consumers in the “Big Data” Era, in EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION: IN GOOD HEALTH? 53–77 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2012). 




This obvious solution prompts an equally obvious objection:  the vast majority of visitors 
do not read Notices.
19
  So doesn’t it follow that the vast majority of visitors fail to give informed 
consent?
20
  No, not as long as hypothetical knowledge counts as sufficient for informed consent.  
The relevant hypothetical knowledge is the knowledge a visitor would gain from reading the 
Notice.  Counting the hypothetical knowledge as sufficient for informed consent is precisely 
what courts do. They invoke the duty to read: as long as a party has an adequate opportunity to 
read and understand an agreement, then the court deems the party to know the terms of the 
agreement even if he or she did not read it.
21
 Thus, if a visitor has an adequate opportunity to 
read and understand a Notice, a court will deem the visitor to know what it says, and—provided 
the Notice sufficiently describes the business’s data collection and use practices—the visitor’s 
consent will count as informed.   
The duty is a special case of the following widely accepted normative principle: if you 
know that, with reasonable time and effort, you could obtain information relevant to a future 
action, and you freely choose not to obtain that information, then, within broad limits, when you 
act, you assume the risk of adverse consequences of which you would have been aware and 
which you could have avoided had you obtained the information. This is why “[i]t will not do for 
a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to abide by its conditions, say that he did 
 
19 See e.g., Beales and Muris, supra note 7. With regard to standard form contracts 
generally, “[t]he fact that consumers do not read standard form contracts is so well 
accepted and documented as to be virtually enshrined as dogma within the contracts 
literature.” Wayne Barnes, Toward A Fairer Model Of Consumer Assent To Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense Of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 237 
(2007). See also R. A Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837–856 (2006). 
20 RADIN, supra note 7. 
21 “One having the capacity to understand a written document who reads it, or, without 
reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature.” JOSEPH PERILLO, 7 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 402 –403 (rev. 2002 ed.). 




not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”
22
  Despite its normative 
pedigree, the duty to read has caused considerable academic concern.
23
  We nonetheless assume 
for the sake of argument that the “duty to read interpretation” of informed consent is correct.  
Our point, which we will develop in Section II, is that Notice and Choice fails to ensure 
informed consent even when we grant that hypothetical knowledge is sufficient to make consent 
informed.   
 
B. Free consent:  Affirmative Act or Passive Acquiescence?  
Courts treat Notices as contracts, and, as Mark Lemley notes, “[a]ssent by both parties to 
the terms of a contract has long been the fundamental principle animating contract law.  Indeed, 
it is the concept of assent that gives contracts legitimacy and distinguishes them from private 
legislation.”
24
  A private party does not have the power to unilaterally impose legally 
enforceable obligations on other adult parties. Only governments can legitimately exercise such 
power.  Special circumstances aside, the only way a private party can impose legally enforceable 
terms on another adult party is to secure that party’s free assent to being bound.   
Margaret Jane Radin offers a useful characterization of when consent is free.  Free 
consent “requires [1] a knowing understanding of what one is doing [2] in a context in which it is 
actually possible for one to do otherwise, and [3] an affirmative action in doing something, rather 
than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting something.”
25
  In her book, Boilerplate, Radin 
 
22 Sanger v. Dunn, 3 N. W. 388, 389 (1879). 
23 See Barnes, supra note 19 (citing and discussing the extensive duty to read literature). 
24 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464–65 (2006). 
25 Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 
1126 (1999). 




argues that only actual knowledge can fulfill the “knowing understanding” requirement,
26
 and 
she concludes that visitors’ consent is not free on the ground that non-reading visitors have only 
hypothetical knowledge of the terms in Notices.  As important as it is, we will not pursue this 
point.  We grant for the sake of argument that hypothetical knowledge fulfills the “knowing 
understanding” requirement.  Our critique is that it is still problematic to regard consent as free.  
The background for that critique is the following argument in favor of the claim that consent is 
free.  An example is helpful.   
Imagine Vicky visits Amazon.com to buy a book.  Two points are clear.  She has (as we 
have granted) a knowing understanding of Amazon’s privacy practices.
27
 Further, the context is 
clearly one in which “it is actually possible . . . to do otherwise.” She is under no compulsion to 
use Amazon.  She could buy books from Barnes and Noble’s website, or not buy books online at 
all.  The critical question concerns the final condition: Is her visit to Amazon’s website “an 
affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting 
something”?  It certainly looks like an affirmative action.  It is an informed decision to exchange 
the data about herself that Amazon collects for the book-buying service Amazon provides, a 
service she is under no compulsion to use.  Vicky would not engage in this exchange if she did 
not judge that the service was worth more to her than her withholding her data.  Her “worth 
more” judgment may be affected by various cognitive biases (over-discounting future risks, for 
example), but, if so, this just shows that her judgment poor, not that her action is unfree.
28
  Free 
choices can be bad choices.  But bad or good, if Vicky chooses because she finds the service 
 
26 RADIN, supra note 7. 




28 OWEN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER 
CONTRACTS (2012). 




worth more to her than not disclosing her data, how can the action be mere passive 
acquiescence?   
 
C. Summing to an Acceptable Tradeoff    
Living in a highly digitized society entails a tradeoff between informational privacy and 
the benefits of information processing. The credit system is a good example.  The billions of 
credit, debit, and bank cards testify to consumers’ embrace of the system, which does indeed 
offer significant benefits. 
The expansion of credit reporting, along with improvements in credit scoring, has 
facilitated substantial expansion in the availability of credit to American consumers, as 
well as the democratization of credit. Credit grantors can make more expeditious 
decisions, often without a personal visit to a loan officer, enabling the phenomenon of 




Consumers opt for the benefits even though, “[u]nlike many other countries, credit reporting in 
the US is ‘full file’ or ‘comprehensive’ reporting, including both positive and negative 
information about consumers.”
30
  In general, studies show that consumers find it acceptable to 
give up some degree of privacy to get the benefits of information processing.  As Harris Poll 
reports,   
almost two-thirds of all adults (64%) are . . . often willing to allow people to have access 
to, and to use, their personal information where they understand the reasons for its use, 
where they see tangible benefits for so doing and when they believe care is taken to 





29 Beales and Muris, supra note 7 at 115–16. 
30 Id. at 115. 
31 Humphrey Taylor, Most People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While Concerned about 
Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It Off for Other Benefit, 17 THE HARRIS POLL (2003), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Most-People-Are-
Privacy-Pragmatists-Who-While-Conc-2003-03.pdf (last visited Nov 8, 2012). 




Of course, not just any tradeoff will do.  Consumers want an acceptable one.  So what counts as 
acceptable?  
An adequate answer requires a clear conception of the benefits and risks. Commentators 
commonly identify the following benefits: increased economic efficiency, improved security, 
better personalization of services, increased availability of relevant information, and innovative 
platforms for communication.
32
  Realizing the benefits requires relinquishing at least some 
degree of control over one's information and thus entails a loss of informational privacy.  Thus, it 
is routine to take the loss of informational privacy as the sole, or at least the most important, risk.  
This “one” risk, however, includes a variety of specific consequences.  “Theorists have 
proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy, friendship, individuality, human 
relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, creativity, independence, imagination, 
counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy, reputation, and psychological well-being.”
33
  
Despite the complex consequences that flow from reducing privacy, this picture of the tradeoff 
 
32 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193–1294 (1998) (emphasizing availability of relevant information, increased economic 
efficiency, improved security); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy 
Decisionmaking in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008) (“policy decisions 
frequently counterpose privacy against two other powerful values:  efficiency and security”); 
For consumer willingness to trade privacy for various benefits, see Taylor, supra note 31; 
PREFERENCECENTRAL, CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES ON ONLINE ADVERTISING - 2010 (2010), 
http://www.preferencecentral.com/consumersurvey/download/(arguing that “over half of 
consumers surveyed indicated that they prefer relevant targeted online ads as a trade-off 
for access to free content”); and ; CHOICESSTREAM, 2006 CHOICESTREAM PERSONALIZATION 
SURVEY, 
http://www.choicestream.com/pdf/ChoiceStream_PersonalizationSurveyResults2006.pdf 
(claiming that only fifteen percent of web users would give up personalization benefits to 
avoid revealing personal details); compare JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED 
ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 
(arguing that the vast majority of consumers find behavioral advertising unacceptable).  The 
opposing studies illustrate the well-known truth about surveys:  what you ask determines 
what you get.  The most reasonable interpretation of the surveys is that consumers reject 
the current privacy/efficiency tradeoff and want a tradeoff that gives them more control 
over their privacy. 
33 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 98 (2008).  See also John Collette, Role 
Demands, Privacy and Psychological Well-Being, 30 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHIATRY 222 (1984).    




problem is not particularly complex:  a relatively short list of benefits competes against the value 
of informational privacy. Recent developments necessitate a much more complicated picture, as 
we argue later,
34
 but we stay with the simpler picture for the moment.   
Even with the simple picture, the balancing task is immense.  The benefits and risks 
affect society as whole. Increasing the availability of relevant information and innovative 
platforms for communication may, for example, yield a better informed and more politically 
involved citizenry.  Increasing privacy risks may create a chilling effect that stunts rather than 
encourages the free exchange of ideas and opinions. Improving the personalization of services 
requires collecting, analyzing, and retaining information that may be also be used for a variety of 
other purposes—to engage in price discrimination, or to determine whether someone qualifies 
for a credit card, mortgage, health insurance, or appointment as a Supreme Court Justice, for 
example.  Price discrimination, the extension of credit, the distribution of health insurance, and 
the composition of the Supreme Court determine in part which segments of society have access 
to what goods and services, and that distribution of goods and services has long-term effects on 
the type of society that evolves, and on whether it distributes benefits and imposes risks fairly.  
Ideally, an acceptable balance is one that cannot be improved, one that is at least as good 
as any other possible balance.  The balancing task is so complex that practice only approximates 
the ideal, and the sensible demand is for a sufficiently close approximation the ideal. The 
balancing task is further complicated by the fact that disagreement on balancing questions is the 
order of the day.  As James Rule remarks, “we cannot hope to answer [complex balancing 
questions] until we have a way of ascribing weights to the things being balanced.  And, that is 
exactly where the parties to privacy debates are most dramatically at odds.”
35
  Disagreements 
 
34 See infra Section II,A,3. 
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about balancing issues in the privacy context are just a special case of disagreement about 
questions of social justice generally.  As John Rawls emphasizes,  
reasoned and uncoerced agreement are not to be expected . . .  Our individual and 
associative points of view, intellectual affinities and affective attachments, are too diverse 
. . . to allow of lasting and reasoned agreement. . .  [The appropriate view of social 
organization] takes deep and unresolvable differences on matters of fundamental 




Notice and Choice appears to offer an appealing way to deal with “deep and unresolvable 
differences on matters of fundamental significance.”   
To see why, consider first that the overall pattern of giving or withholding consent does 
indeed draw a line between permissible and impermissible uses of information. It is a complex 
line varying with the vagaries of consent, but it is a line nonetheless, and, as such, it defines a 
complex and varying tradeoff between the benefits of processing information and the need to 
protect informational privacy.  Merely to define a tradeoff is of course not necessarily to define 
an acceptable one.  An acceptable tradeoff has to adequately balance the benefits and risks to 
society as a whole.  But why shouldn’t the individual consent decisions sum to precisely, or at 
least approximately, that balance?  If each person gives free and informed consent to the 
tradeoffs that are acceptable to that person, why should not the overall result of all such decisions 
be an acceptable tradeoff for society as a whole?   
As we argue later, there is very little reason to it will.
37
  However, the only tradeoff 
mechanism we can find in the Notice and Choice literature is the combined effect of the 
individual consent decisions, so we take a commitment to this approach to be implicit it in the 
literature’s endorsement of Notice and Choice.  For the most part, proponents of Notice and 
 
36 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 515–
572, 534 (1980). 
37 See infra Section II, A.   




Choice do not explicitly address the tradeoff problem.
38
  However, as Paul Schwartz and Daniel 
Solove note, “The idea behind notice and choice can be summarized in this fashion:  As long as a 
company provides notice of its privacy practices, and people have some kind of choice about 
whether to provide the data or not, then privacy is sufficiently protected.”
39
  Schwartz and 
Solove do not provide any gloss on what they regard as “sufficiently protected,” but, on any view 
that recognizes the need to balance the value of privacy against the benefits of information 
processing, privacy is not protected in the right way if the overall tradeoff is unacceptable.
40
   
 
II. The Critique 
Our critique is that Notice and Choice ensures neither free nor informed consent; nor 
does it yield an acceptable tradeoff.  We begin with the argument that consent is not informed.   
 
 
38 For example, one of the Federal Trade Commission’s earlier endorsements of Notice and 
Choice came in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf; 
Commission Swindle in dissent sharply criticized the report for its lack of attention to 
tradeoff questions, “The Privacy Report fails to pose and to answer basic questions that all 
regulators and lawmakers should consider before embarking on extensive regulation that 
could severely stifle the New Economy. Shockingly, there is absolutely no consideration of 
the costs and benefits of regulation; nor the effects on competition and consumer choice; 
nor the experience to date with government regulation of privacy; nor constitutional 
implications and concerns; nor how this vague and vast mandate will be enforced.”ORSON 
SWINDLE, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ORSON SWINDLE IN PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR 
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/swindledissent.pdf; Unfortunately, it is common for 
proponents of Notce and Choice to over-emphasize consent and ignore important tradeoff 
issues. See Cate, supra note 3 at 361–367.   
39 Schwartz and Solove, supra note 7 at 1. 
40 In his excellent book, Privacy in Peril, James Rule seems in the end to endorse the claim 
that the combined effect of informed consent decisions yields an acceptable tradeoff. He 
recommends that in “the private sector [the following] precept should apply: no use of 
personal data for institutional surveillance without meaningful informed consent from the 
individual.” RULE, supra note 1 at 196. Rule notes that this precept would alter the existing 
tradeoff between privacy and a variety of competing concerns, and he endorses the change. 




A. It Is Impossible for a Notice to Contain Enough Information 
A visitor’s consent is informed if he or she has sufficient knowledge of the practices to 
make a reasonable evaluation of the risks and benefits of disclosing information.  Notice and 
Choice claims to remedy visitors’ lack of knowledge of data collection and use practices by 
presenting sufficient information in a Notice.  The criticism is that it is impossible for a Notice to 
contain enough information.  The argument turns on two facts.  First, current data collection 
practices are extremely complex.  Second, these practices collect information on one occasion 
for one purpose and then retain, analyze, and distribute it for a variety of other purposes in 
unpredictable ways.  We start with the complexity point. 
 
1. Complexity 
Websites feed information to a complex ecosystem that tracks consumers’ online 
activities in order to deliver tailored advertising.
41
  We offer a simplified model consisting of 
only five entities:  profilers, advertising agencies, advertising exchanges, websites that display 
the advertisements, and businesses that purchase the advertisements.
42
  Profilers segment buyers 
into groups to predict their willingness to buy.
43
  eXelate, for example, collects information 
about age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, profession, Internet search information, and information 
 
41 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf; 
COMMENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY AND U.S. PIRG, supra note 7; Schwartz and 
Solove, supra note 7. 
 
42 Models may distinguish several more entities and functions. For example, some make a 
subtle distinction between advertising networks and advertising exchanges. See, e.g., Data 
Usage & Control Primer: Best Practices & Definitions, INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU 12 (2010), 
http://www.iab.net/media/file/data-primer-final.pdf. 
43 See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 
6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 462-64 (2011). 






  The purpose of the profiles is to target text and display advertising.
45
  
Advertising exchanges, such as Google’s AdSense, deliver advertisements to the websites that 
display them.
46 
 When a visitor arrives at a website, an advertising exchange combines the 
visitor’s profile with information about his or her current website activity in order to more 
precisely target advertisements.
47
  The exchange then conducts an auction in which businesses 
bid for the opportunity to present their targeted advertisements (the whole process takes 
milliseconds).
48
 The complexity is immense.  As Helen Nissenbaum says, 
consider what might need to be conveyed to users to provide notice of what information 
is captured, where it is sent, and how it is used. The technical and institutional story is so 
complicated that probably only a handful of deep experts would be able to piece together 
a full account . . .  Even if, for a given moment, a snapshot of the information flows could 
be grasped, the realm is in constant flux, with new firms entering the picture, new 
analytics, and new back-end contracts forged: in other words, we are dealing with a 




Nissenbaum concludes that “the complexity makes it not only difficult to convey what practices 
are followed and what constraints respected, but practically impossible.”
50
 This follows given the 
specificity assumption we noted in the last section:  to provide enough knowledge for an 
informed decision, a Notice must contain an adequate amount specific detail about the type of 
 
44 See Emily Steel, Exploring Ways to Build a Better Consumer Profile, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 
2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447104575117972284656374.html. 
45 See Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 4 (2011) (“These profiles allow websites and ISPs to 
serve advertisements and other services that are targeted to their customers’ interests.”). 
46 See AdSense Basics, GOOGLE, 
http://support.google.com/adsense/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=9712 (last visited Sept. 
21, 2012). 
47 See Schwartz and Solove, supra note 2 at 1851–1852. 
48 See id. at 1852. 
49 Nissenbaum, supra note 7 at 35–36.  See also CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, IN THE 
MATTER OF REAL-TIME TARGETING AND AUCTIONING, DATA PROFILING OPTIMIZATION, AND ECONOMIC 
LOSS TO CONSUMERS AND PRIVACY (2010), 
http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/20100407-FTCfiling.pdf 
(discussing in detail the complexity of the online advertising ecosystem). 
50 Nissenbaum, supra note 7. 




data collected, the purposes for which it is used, and the third parties with which it is shared.  
This is why Nissenbaum asks one to “consider what might need to be conveyed to users to 
provide notice of what information is captured, where it is sent, and how it is used.”
51
 The 
system is so complex that any attempt to trace what information is collected, the purposes for 
which it used, and where it goes is “so complicated that probably only a handful of deep experts 
would be able to piece together a full account.”
52
 This makes it difficult to make a Notice 
sufficiently informative.  It is practically impossible because the advertising ecosystem has a 
“recursive capacity that is indefinitely extensible”
53
 so that even an accurate “snapshot of the 
information flows”
54
 is valid only for a short time.  
 The inference from complexity to impossibility leans heavily on the specificity 
assumption requirement that a Notice must provide sufficient detail about the workings of the 
current advertising ecosystem.  The next impossibility argument, based on long-term data 
retention, does not assume that a Notice must contain specific details beyond merely identifying 
the purposes for which collected information is used.   
2. Long-term retention  
The advertising ecosystem collects information for one purpose and retains it for use for 
other unpredictable purposes in the future.  The retention of data for unpredictable future 
purposes means the Notice would have to contain information no one knows.  As Daniel Solove 
observes,    
An individual may give out bits of information in different contexts, each transfer 
appearing innocuous.  However, the information can be aggregated and could prove to be 










standpoint of each particular information transaction, individuals will not have enough 
facts to make a truly informed decision.  The potential future uses of that information are 




One cannot put in a Notice what one does not know.   
In light of the one-two punch of complexity and long-term data retention, one may well 
wonder how Notice and Choice has survived as long as it has as seriously advocated policy.  The 
answer is that proponents of Notice and Choice typically argue for restrictions on data collection 
and use that greatly reduce both complexity and long-term data retention.  The Federal Trade 
Commission, for example, insists that “companies should limit data collection to that which is 
consistent with the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s relationship with the 
business, or as required or specifically authorized by law.”
56
  The Commission also demands that 
companies “implement reasonable restrictions on the retention of data and should dispose of it 
once the data has outlived the legitimate purpose for which it was collected.”
57
  
We think minimizing data collection is unwise and unrealistic. Our arguments appeal to 
the fact that “[w]e live in the age of Big Data.”
58
   
 
3. Big Data and its implications 
“Big data” refers to the acquisition and analysis of massive collections of information, 




55 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
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56 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 4 at 27. See also infra note 8. 
57 Id. at 28. The FTC is hardly alone in its insistence on Notice and Choice combined with 
significant restrictions on data collection and retention.  The European Union takes a similar 
approach. Solove and Hoofnagle, supra note 8; RULE, supra note 1. 
58 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149364 (last 
visited Oct 29, 2012). 
59 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy In The Age Of Big Data:  A Time For Big Decision, 
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The key point here is that analyzing massive collections of data reveals patterns that would 
otherwise go unnoticed.
60
 The analysis often requires analyzing data collected and retained over 
long periods of time.  This is why the “big data business model is antithetical to data 
minimization. It incentivizes collection of more data for longer periods of time. It is aimed 
precisely at those unanticipated secondary uses, the ‘crown jewels’ of big data.”
61
   
 A well-known example is Dr. Russ Altman’s discovered that taking the antidepressant 
Paxil together with the anti-cholesterol drug Pravachol could result in diabetic blood sugar 
levels.
62
  He made two uses of big data. He obtained a symptomatic footprint characteristic of 
very high blood sugar levels by analyzing thirty years of reports in the Federal Drug 
Administration’s Adverse Event Reporting System database, and then found that footprint in the 
Bing searches using an algorithm that detected statistically significant correlations. People taking 
both drugs also tended to enter search terms (“fatigue” and “headache,” for example) that 
constitute the symptomatic footprint.   
This is not an isolated example.  Big data analyses have reduced emergency room costs,
63
 
improved the treatment for cystic fibrosis, created life-saving treatment for premature babies,
64
 
helped combat polio in Ethiopia,
65
 improved access to social services in India by creating digital 
 
60 See, e.g., Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION UNVEILS “BIG DATA” INITIATIVE: ANNOUNCES $200 MILLION IN NEW R&D 
INVESTMENTS (2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/big_data_press_release.pdf 
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collections of digital data, the initiative promises to help solve some the Nation’s most 
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61 Tene and Polonetsky, supra note 59 at 22. 
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 and improved police response times by using acoustic sensors to detect and triangulate the 
sound of gunfire.
67
   
Such restrictions would also be unwise.  Adopting them mean turning our backs on the 
benefits Big Data offers.  Surely judicious balancing of risks and benefits is better.  Accordingly, 
we reject the restrictions that would be required to give Notices a reasonable chance of being 
sufficiently informative.  In any case, the big data genie is not about to go back in the bottle.
68
 
Suggesting the imposition of severe restrictions on data collection and retention is about as 
realistic as shouting at a tidal wave that it should stop.   
 
B. How Can Consent Be Anything But Passive Acquiescence?   
The argument against Vicky’s use of Amazon being passive acquiescence was that she 
regards using Amazon as worth more to her than surrendering her data.  The problem is that it 
does not follow from the “worth more” judgment that her use is not mere passive acquiescence.  
Compare a thief who, with a gun to your head, demands, “Your money or your life!”  You hand 
over the money because you regard your life as being worth more than the money, but, if 
anything is a case of passive acquiescence, you handing over the money is.  There is no gun to 
Vicky’s head, but her choice is also highly constrained.  She could use a different online book 
seller—Barnes and Noble, for example, but Barnes and Noble’s practices are very similar to 
 
66 Id. at 72. 
67 Id. at 87. 
68 See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS:  WHY THINKING  BY NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 
(2007).  Nate Silver expresses some well justified caution. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE 
NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL — BUT SOME DON’T 9 – 12 (2012). The book as a whole, 
however, illustrates that Big Data has come of age. See also Tene and Polonetsky, supra 
note 58; SMOLAN AND ERWITT, supra note 63; BARRY DEVLIN, SHAWN ROGERS & JOHN MYERS, BIG 
DATA COMES OF AGE (2012), http://www.9sight.com/Big_Data_Comes_of_Age.pdf. 






  Indeed, virtually all online sellers collect and use a significant amount of data.
70
  
Vicky could of course only buy books from brick and mortar bookstores, but such stores are 
disappearing, and the ones that remain carry only a limited inventory.  In any case, Vicky wants 
the convenience of online shopping.  She could research online sellers’ Notices to find those 
most consistent with her privacy preferences, but she is not willing to spend that much time and 
effort. She is already committed to a variety of goals—raising her children, pursuing her career, 
enjoying her friends, and so on—and the time she is willing to allot to buying books is relatively 
brief. So agreeing to a seller’s data collection practices is her only viable option.  
It does not follow however that Vicky’s consent is not free.  The gun to the head example 
notwithstanding, highly constrained choices can in some cases still be free.  Imagine, for 
example, that your dream vacation is to go to the Cayman Islands.  Your budget makes the trip 
impossible unless you opt for an “all inclusive” vacation package that offers airfare, hotel, and 
food for a single affordable price.  When you sit down to eat the food, your choice is highly 
constrained (your options being go hungry or spend money you cannot afford), but, unlike the 
thief’s demand, the constraint is not a profound and wholly unjustified interference with your 
pursuit of plans and projects which you value and to which you are committed. It is just the 
opposite; the constraint is a means that you freely choose in order to realize your vacation goal.  
You eat the food freely in the sense that doing so is a fully justified component of a freely chosen 
overall plan.  This is a common pattern.   You may have no practical option other than driving 
your children to daycare.  You have to work; there is no one to care for them at home; and so on.  
 
69 Compare Amazon.com, supra note 14 to Barnes and Noble, PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/help/cds2.asp?PID=25556. 
70 See Felicia Williams, Internet Privacy Policies: A Composite Index for Measuring 
Compliance to the Fair Information Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071010feliciawilliams.pdf (“The 
vast majority of the privacy policies stated the firms have the right to share any data with 
any third party for any reason.”). 




But your driving them to daycare is part of the pursuit of the freely adopted project of raising 
your children and as such it is not passive acquiescence but an affirmative action. 
When Vicky buys from Amazon, is her constrained choice more like the gun to the head 
example or the daycare and Cayman Island examples?  Schwartz and Solove evidently believe it 
is more like the gun to the head.  They contend that   
the “choice” presented is more of a Hobson’s choice than a real one.  Many companies 
present consumers with a take-it-or-leave-it choice that provides hardly any ability for 
consumers to bargain about their privacy preferences. If a consumer wants to buy a 
product, read a website, subscribe to a magazine, use a service, and so on, the consumer 
can be forced either to surrender privacy or to go elsewhere. But when nearly all 
companies offer the same take-it-or-leave-it approach, consumers desiring to protect their 




Similarly, Todd Rakoff contends that “The consumer's experience of modern commercial life is 
one not of freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law, but rather one of 
submission to organizational domination, leavened by the ability to choose the organization by 
which he will be dominated.”
72
 
In section III, we argue that Schwartz, Solove, and Rakfoff are half right:  in some cases 
website visitors’ “Choices” are passive acquiescence; some are not.   
 
C. Notice and Choice Leads to Unacceptable Tradeoffs   
The Notice and Choice tradeoff claim is that if each person gives free and informed 
consent to the tradeoffs that are acceptable to that person, the overall result is some reasonably 
close approximation to an ideally acceptable tradeoff.  It is extremely unlikely that this is true.  
Our argument distinguishes two tradeoff problems.  First is the simple problem, which is the 
problem we described earlier.  The benefits are increased economic efficiency, improved 
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security, better personalization of services, increased availability of relevant information, and 
innovative platforms for communication.  The risk is the loss of informational privacy.  The 
second problem, the real tradeoff problem, involves a greatly expanded range of risks and 
benefits.  Notice and Choice fails to solve the simple problem and even more clearly fails to 
solve the real problem. 
 
1. The simple tradeoff problem 
Recall our earlier argument in favor of the Notice and Choice solution to the simple 
tradeoff problem.  We concluded by asking, “If each person gives free and informed consent to 
the tradeoffs that are acceptable to that person, why shouldn’t the overall result of all such 
decisions be an acceptable tradeoff for society as a whole?”  The “It should” answer is actually 
far from plausible.   
To begin with, there are many situations in which individuals’ decision do not add up to 
an acceptable overall result.  One famous example is the story of railway transportation to and 
from Ithaca, New York, a story that prompted the economist Alfred E. Kahn to write his famous 
article, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and The Limits of 
Economics.
73
  The last passenger train left Ithaca, New York in 1961.
74
 Faced with the decision 
to travel by car, bus, air, or train, so many choose car, bus, or air that train service was no longer 
profitable and the railroad ceased to offer it even though it was the only reliable form of 
transportation in foul weather and in peak traffic conditions. Kahn suggests the discontinuance 
produced an unacceptable tradeoff: 
 
73 Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and The 
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Suppose each person in the cities served were to ask himself how much he would have 
been willing to pledge regularly over some time period, say annually, by purchase of 
prepaid tickets, to keep rail passenger service available to his community. As long as the 
amount that he would have declared (to himself) would have exceeded what he actually 
paid on the period—and my own introspective experiment shows that it would—then to 




Assuming, as Kahn does, that his reaction is representative, the lack of train service is 
unacceptable to most of those affected.   
 Notice and Choice is likely to produce a similar unacceptable result.  The result in this 
case is the world Daniel Solove warns us we rapidly approach.  He fears that we are 
heading toward a world where an extensive trail of information fragments about us will 
be forever preserved on the Internet, displayed instantly in a Google search. We will be 
forced to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with us for 
life wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world. This data can 
often be of dubious reliability; it can be false and defamatory; or it can be true but deeply 
humiliating or discrediting. We may find it increasingly difficult to have a fresh start, a 
second chance, or a clean slate. We might find it harder to engage in self-exploration if 
every false step and foolish act is chronicled forever in a permanent record. This record 
will affect our ability to define our identities, to obtain jobs, to participate in public life, 
and more.
76
   
 
Despite widespread disagreement about what counts as an acceptable tradeoff, we think most 
would find the world Solove envisions unacceptable.  We think the combined effect of individual 
consent decisions is likely to lead to that world.  We do so because we share James Rule’s 
assessment of the plight of privacy:   
Ever-emerging technological possibilities and the ingenuity of planners generate a study 
stream of new ways of creating, capturing, and using personal data for one institutional 
purpose or another.  And these innovations planned or accomplished pose one challenge 
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To make matters worse, there is a progressive “desensitization of publics to everyday demands 
on privacy.  The sheer ubiquity of pressures for personal information, the variety of situations in 
which they occur, and the seeming lack of alternatives—all these things apparently conspire to 
create a sense that resistance is futile.”
78
  A sense of futility that results in acquiescence to 
increasing ever-increasing data collection and use is likely to lead the world in which “[w]e will 
be forced to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with us for life 
wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world.”   
 Even if that world does not become a reality, we find it hard to believe that the sum of 
individual consent decisions will yield an acceptable result.  An acceptable tradeoff has to 
balance society-wide long-term effects.  As James Rule notes, “any judgments about where and 
how to draw a line against endless, incremental erosion of privacy requires that most elusive of 
visions—a view of the whole.”
79
  Notice and Choice fails to incorporate an adequate view of the 
whole.  Visitors have little understanding of businesses’ data collection practices and of the 
attendant benefits.  Why would individual decisions driven by individual concerns and based on 
whatever information is available at the time somehow add up an acceptable tradeoff?  Even if 
Notices could, per impossible, contain all relevant information, and even if all visitors read and 
understood Notices, they would not have the information they need.  The information required to 
adequately balance the benefits and risks concerns complex society-wide consequences that 
unfold over a long period of time.  The lack of information problem becomes particularly severe 
when we turn to the complex real problem. 
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2. The real tradeoff problem 
 The simple tradeoff problem is no longer the actual problem.   “Big data” is a primary 
reason.  Big Data offers a much wider range of both risks and benefits than are present in the 
simple tradeoff.  Our earlier examples are sufficient to illustrate the breadth of the benefits—
from detecting drug interactions to reducing emergency room costs to improving police response 
times.
80
  As even our very short list illustrates, the benefits are extraordinarily diverse.  
Moreover, one very important range of benefits is perhaps the one hardest to predict: new 
products and services.  As the World Economic Forum has observed, personal data “will emerge 
as a new asset class touching all aspects of society.”
81
  The risks are equally broad and diverse.  
Big Data and Big Data analytics expand the range of possibilities, and making those possibilities 
realities typically creates both benefits and risks.  The loss of informational privacy remains a 
key concern, but there is a wide range of other risks.  For example, using digital IDs to improve 
access to social services in India will increase the demand for such services.  Meeting the 
demand will mean an increased investment in those services, and that will have complex positive 
and negative effects on the Indian economy    
The “view of the whole”
82
 visitors need to make acceptable tradeoffs among such a 
complex array of benefits and risk far exceeds the view needed for the—already extremely 
difficult—task of balancing a short list of benefits against the loss of informational privacy.  
Visitors do not have the relevant information, nor do they generally have the expertise or 
experience required to make the complex tradeoffs involved.  Thus, there is no reason to think 
that the individual consent decisions would sum to an acceptable outcome.   
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III. Beyond Notice and Choice 
We see no acceptable way to rescue Notice and Choice.  We think an alternative is 
necessary, and that informational norms provide it.  Informational norms   
[g]enerally . . . circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals 
that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed. In 
medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition or, more 
specifically, the patient shares information about his or her physical condition with the 
physician but not vice versa; among friends we may pour over romantic entanglements 
(our own and those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial 
information; with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to 
discuss work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.
83
   
 
When informational norms govern online businesses data collection and use practices, website 
visitors give free and informed consent to acceptable tradeoffs.
84
  Or rather, they do as long as 
the norms have the property that we call being value-optimal.  We will first introduce the notion 
of value-optimality and then explain why, if there are value-optimal informational norms 
governing websites, then visitors give free and informed consent to acceptable tradeoffs. Our 
explanation is brief.  So much so that we may seem open to Bertrand Russell’s objection that 
“[t]he method of ‘postulating’ what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the 
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ETHICS 430 (Richard A. Spinello & Herman T. Tavani eds., 2001); Julie E. Cohen, Examined 
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STANDFORD LAW REVIEW 1373 
(2000); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 559–596 (1998); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999); MICHAEL PHILLIPS, BETWEEN 
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advantages of theft over honest toil.”
85
 Our reply is that we are neither thieving nor toiling.  We 
are indicating where to toil, indicating the “park” in which to look for free and informed consent.   
 
A. Value-Optimality 
A norm is value-optimal when, in light of the values of members of the group in which 
the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any alternative.
86
  A norm that is at least 
as well justified as any alternative is either better justified than any alternative, or is tied with one 
or more alternatives that are also better than the rest.  The point is that there is no better 
alternative.  There are many optimality notions; Pareto optimality is perhaps the most well-
known.
87
   
Appeal to value-optimality allows us to define the ideal of norm completeness.  Norm-
completeness holds for transactions between visitors and online businesses when there is no 
significant tradeoff between privacy and competing goals that is not governed by at least one 
value-optimal informational norm.
88
  Three further points about norm-completeness clarify its 
role.   
 
85 BETRAND RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 71 (1920). 
86 We do not mean to suggest that people explicitly think that conformity to the norm is at 
least as well justified as any alternative.  Typically, people just unreflectively conform to the 
norm. The point is that one could justify conformity if one reflected on the norm under ideal 
conditions (including having sufficient time, sufficient information, lack of bias, and so on). 
We also put aside the issue of how many members of a group have to conform for the norm 
to exist.  We simply assume “almost all” and leave “almost” undefined.   
87 A situation is Pareto optimal when, and only when, it is not possible to improve the well-
being of any one person without making others worse off.   
88 Since we allow data collected at one time to be indefinitely retained for future use, we 
need to introduce a temporal dimension into the definition of norm completeness.  A more 
accurate statement would be:  there is no significant tradeoff between privacy and 
competing goals at a given time that is not governed by at least one value-optimal 
informational norm existing at that time.  We put aside the (important) complication that 
tradeoffs in the future may involve individuals who did not exist at the time the transaction 
was made. 




First, it is plausible to assume that practice more or less approximates norm completeness 
for traditional, non-digital goods and services.  Buyers and sellers have exchanged goods and 
services for centuries, and it is plausible to assume that, over the years, relevant value-optimal 
norms have evolved.
89
  A critical concern that we address below is that rapid advances in 
technology have outstripped the relatively slow evolution of norms and created novel situations 
for which we lack relevant value-optimal informational norms. 
Second, in assuming transactions are governed by norms, we are assuming that both 
visitors and businesses conform to the norms.  This is certainly plausible for visitors since the 
norms in question implement values they hold.  But what about businesses?  Norm-conforming 
visitors look like easy targets for exploitation.  What will keep profit-motive-driven businesses 
from imposing norm-inconsistent terms in Notices they know visitors do not read?  We have 
given our answer in detail elsewhere.
90
  Addressing this question is an essential part of the “toil” 
necessary to understand the role of norms in markets and cultures.     
Finally, why take norm completeness as an ideal?  Because, when it is true, every 
significant tradeoff is an acceptable one to which buyers give free and informed consent. We 
begin by explaining why tradeoffs governed by value-optimal norms are acceptable.     
 
 
89  The norm in now incorporated into the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, which is 
asserted in Uniform Commercial Code section 2-314(2)(c). For a fuller discussion, see JAMES 
OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD (2004). The norm in now incorporated 
into the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, which is asserted in Uniform Commercial Code 
section 2-314(2)(c). For a fuller discussion, see Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, 
Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 101, 116–121 (2012). 
90 SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 84. 




B. Acceptable Tradeoffs 
All informational norms—value-optimal and non-value-optimal alike—implement a 
tradeoff between privacy and competing concerns.  They permit some information processing, 
and thus secure some of its benefits, but they protect privacy by allowing only certain 
processing.  When the norm is value-optimal, the tradeoff it implements it is justified by visitors’ 
values (with no alternative that better justified). The tradeoff is acceptable in this sense.   
  
C. Why Consent is Informed   
A visitor’s consent is informed if the visitor can make a reasonable evaluation of the risks 
and benefits of disclosing information.  Visitors easily meet this requirement as long as norm 
completeness holds. Norm-completeness ensures that every transaction is governed by 
appropriate value–optimal norms, and, as long as visitors know that their transactions are so 
governed, they know all they need to make a reasonable evaluation of the risks and benefits of 
disclosing information.  They know all they need because uses of the visitor’s information—both 
uses now and uses in the unpredictable future—will implement tradeoffs between privacy and 
competing goals that are not only entirely consistent with their values.  Surely, that is enough to 
evaluate the risks and benefits.   
Thus, when norm completeness holds, one may reject the specificity assumption. 
Informed consent does not require knowing in some detail “what information is captured, where 
it is sent, and how it is used.”
91
 Visitors just need to know that data collection and use will be 
consistent with relevant value-optimal norms.  Some may object that this just substitutes one 
problem for another.  The problem of finding a way to give visitors enough detailed information 
disappears, but another difficult problem takes its place:  the problem of ensuring that 
 
91 Nissenbaum, supra note 7at 35.  See also infra Section I, A. 




appropriate value-optimal norms exist.  Online data collection and analysis is one of many areas 
in which rapid advances in technology have outstripped the relatively slow evolution of norms 
and created novel situations for which we lack relevant value-optimal informational norms.   
We do not disagree.  Indeed, our point was precisely to replace the “knowledge of 
sufficient detail” problem with the problem of creating relevant value-optimal norms.  We think 
this is where critical work needs to be done.  We will return to this point shortly. 
 
D. Why Consent Is Free 
In our earlier discussion of free consent, we argued that even a highly constrained choice 
could be a free choice, but we left open the question of whether Vicky’s constrained choice 
qualifies as free.  Our answer is, “It depends.”   
It depends on whether the transaction is governed by relevant value-optimal 
informational norms.  Assume it is.  Then the norm-governed transaction give Vicky just want 
she wants and needs—a key time-saving means to pursue the plans and projects to which she is 
committed.  She allots only a relatively small amount of time to purchasing books.  She wants to 
purchase suitable books within that time and return to pursuing her other goals.  She knows 
Amazon will process some range of personal information, and she wants an acceptable tradeoff 
between informational privacy and other relevant risks and benefits.  The norm-governed 
transaction gives a ready-made value-optimal tradeoff.  It is a highly efficient way for her to 
carry out her transaction with a minimum of attention or effort to privacy tradeoffs.  Thus, as in 
the daycare and Cayman Islands examples, her constrained choice is the choice that fits in with 








We conclude that, when buyers conform to value-optimal norms, buyers give free and 
informed consent to the norm-implemented trade-offs.    
But what happens when a transaction is not governed by relevant value-optimal norms?  
Then there is no explanation of free and informed consent in terms of value-optimal norms, and, 
since we see no other effective mechanism for visitors to give free and informed consent, we 
conclude there is—as a practical matter—no effective way at all for visitors to give free and 
informed consent.  Unfortunately this is precisely the situation website visitors face today.  As 
we noted earlier, rapid advances in technology have created many situations for which we lack 
relevant value-optimal informational norms.  The result is a radical failure of norm 
completeness.  There are two ways this can and does happen: (1) relevant norms exist, but they 
are not value-optimal; or (2) relevant norms do not exist at all. We have discussed both cases in 
detail elsewhere.
93
     
 
IV. A Key Task: Curing Failures of Norm Completeness 
It is essential to develop a theory of norms and privacy,
94
 and to find ways to generate 
appropriate norms when necessary.  Our view happens to be that, with the notable exception of 
 
92 Elsewhere we argued that the third condition was not fulfilled but that its lack of 
fulfillment did not impugn the freedom of the choice. That argument is essentially the same 
as the argument we give her; we have simply chosen what we now regard as a better way 
to frame it. For the earlier argument, see SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 84; Richard Warner 
& Robert H Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms, 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 15 (2012). 
93 Most fully in SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 84. We offer a more technical discussion of 
some aspects of our theory in Warner and Sloan, supra note 92. 
94 See Meg McEvoy, Commissioners Brill, Ohlhausen Discuss FTC Notice-Consent, Data Use 
Regulatory Models, BLOOMBER BNA, PRIVACY LAW WATCH, March 13, 2013, 




behavioral advertising, legal regulation is require to generate the needed norms, and we outline 
some norm-generating strategies in Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Security and 
Privacy.
95
  Our goal here, however, has just been to point out the “park” in which the work is to 
be done, not to argue for building a particular type of structure inside it.   
 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X6M5N9GS000000?jcsearch=bna%2520A0D6X2
D3B3#jcite (suggesting the need for data use norms). 
95 SLOAN AND WARNER, supra note 84. 
